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Abstract— Thanks to new regulations like GDPR, Personal Data 
Management Systems (PDMS) have become a reality. This 
decentralized way of managing personal data provides a de facto 
protection against massive attacks on central servers. But, when 
performing distributed computations, this raises the question of how 
to preserve individuals' trust on their PDMS? And how to guarantee 
the integrity of the final result? This paper proposes a secure 
computing framework capitalizing on the use of Trusted Execution 
Environments at the edge of the network to tackle these questions. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Smart disclosure initiatives (e.g., Blue Button in the US, 
MiData in UK, MesInfos in France) and new privacy-
protection regulations (e.g., GDPR in Europe [1]) allow 
individuals to get their personal data back and manage it under 
control, in a fully decentralized way, using so-called Personal 
Data Management Systems (PDMS) [3]. Decentralization is 
paramount in terms of privacy protection by reducing the 
Benefit/Cost ratio of an attack compared to a central server. 
However, crossing data of multiple individuals (e.g., 
computing statistics or clustering data for an epidemiological 
or sociological study, training a neural network to organize 
bank records into categories or predict diagnoses according to 
medical symptoms, etc.) is of utmost personal and societal 
interest. This raises the question “how to preserve the trust of 
individuals on their PDMS while engaging their data in a 
distributed process that they cannot control?”. The dual 
question from the querier side (i.e., the party initiating the 
processing) is “how to guarantee the honesty of a computation 
performed by a myriad of untrusted participants?”. These are 
the two questions targeted by this paper. 
Answering these questions requires establishing mutual 
trust between all parties in a distributed computation. On the 
one hand, any (PDMS) participant must get the guarantee that 
only the data required by the computation are collected and 
that only the final result of the computation he consents to 
contribute to, is disclosed (i.e., none of the collected raw data 
can be leaked). On the other hand, the querier must get the 
guarantee that the final result has been honestly computed, 
with the appropriate code, on top of genuine data. Besides this, 
the computing scheme must be generic and scalable (e.g., tens 
of thousands of participants) to have a practical interest. 
No state of the art solution tackles all dimensions of this 
problem. Multi-party computation (MPC) works guarantee 
that only the final result of a computation is disclosed but they 
are either not generic in terms of supported computation or not 
scalable in the number of participants [10]. Similarly, gossip-
based [2], homomorphic encryption-based [13] or differential 
privacy-based solutions are restricted to a limited set of 
operations that can be computed. Moreover, none of these 
solutions tackle the limited data collection and computation 
honesty issues. Recent works like [21] address the problem of 
authenticated query results, but focus on a single-user context, 
where the user is the querier.  
In this paper, we argue that the emergence of Trusted 
Execution Environments (TEE) [15] definitely changes the 
game. TEEs, like ARM's TrustZone or Intel's Software Guard 
eXtention (SGX), are becoming omnipresent, from high-end 
servers to PC and mobile devices. TEEs are able to compute 
arbitrary functions over sensitive data while guaranteeing data 
confidentiality and code integrity. This opens new 
opportunities to think about secure distributed processing with 
the hope to reconcile security with genericity and scalability.  
But TEEs are far from providing a direct solution on their 
own. They have not been designed with edge computing 
involving a large number of participants in mind. Moreover, 
while TEE tamper-resistance makes attacks difficult, specific 
side-channel attacks have been shown feasible [19]. Without 
appropriate counter-measures, a minority of corrupted 
participants may endanger the data from the majority. Based 
on this statement, the paper makes four contributions: 
 it defines a generic and scalable TEE-based computing 
protocol over decentralized PDMSs which provides the 
expected mutual trust and computation honesty properties, 
assuming this protocol has been safely executed;  
 it provides, for each participant and the querier, a solution 
to locally check that the protocol has indeed been honestly 
executed, without resorting to any trusted third party;  
 it proposes accurate counter-measures against side-channel 
attacks conducted by corrupted TEE participants;  
 finally, it qualitatively and quantitatively evaluates the 
scalability and security of the solution on practical use-
cases (group-by queries, k-means clustering). 
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
A. Security properties and limits of TEEs 
Relying on secure hardware, existing Trusted Execution 
Environments (TEEs) provide three main security properties: 
(1) code isolation, meaning that an attacker controlling a 
corrupted user environment/OS cannot influence the behavior 
of a program executing within a TEE enclave, (2) 
confidentiality, meaning that private data residing in an 
enclave may never be observed, and (3) attestation, allowing 
to prove the identity of the code running inside a TEE [20].  
                                                          
1 Scalable solutions exist to meet this requirement [11] but this problem is 
orthogonal to this paper. 
The only type of attacks successfully conducted so far over 
TEE are side channel attacks [19]. The TEE in this case 
behaves in a “sealed glass proof” mode [18], i.e., the 
confidentiality property is compromised, but the isolation and 
attestation properties still holds (these properties are not 
challenged today). These attacks are complex to perform and 
require physically instrumenting the TEE, which prevents 
large scale attacks. However, TEEs corrupted by side-channel 
attacks cannot be detected by honest ones as their behavior is 
still the correct one. 
B. Trust model 
The trust model considered in this paper stems from the 
decentralized nature of the targeted infrastructure.  
Untrusted user devices and infrastructure. No credible 
security assumptions can be made on the execution 
environment running on widely open personal devices (PC, 
laptop, home box, smartphone, etc.) managed by non-experts. 
We thus consider that the device OS and applications can be 
corrupted. We also consider the communication infrastructure 
as untrusted. We however assume that the communication 
flow incurred by the computed algorithm is (made) data 
independent, i.e., that personal data cannot be inferred by 
observing the communication pattern among participants1.  
Large set of trusted TEEs, small set of corrupted TEEs. 
We assume that each individual owns a TEE-enabled device 
hosting his personal data (i.e., his PDMS). This is definitely 
no longer fantasy considering the omnipresence of ARM's 
TrustZone or Intel's SGX on most PC, tablets and 
smartphones. As explained above, a small subset of TEEs 
could have been corrupted by malicious participants to break 
their confidentiality with side-channel attacks. 
Trusted computation code. We consider that the code 
distributed to the participants has been carefully reviewed and 
approved beforehand by a regulatory body (e.g., an 
association or national privacy regulatory agency). But the 
fact that the code is trusted does not imply that its execution 
behaves as expected. 
Trusted citizen identity. We consider that citizens have 
been assigned a private/public key by a trusted (e.g., 
governmental) entity (e.g., as used today for paying taxes 
online). This prohibits attackers generating multiple identities 
with the objective to massively contribute to a computation to 
isolate a small set of participants and infer their data. 
C. Problem statement 
The problem can be formulated as follows:  how to 
translate the trust provided to the computation code by the 
regulatory body into a mutual trust between all parties 
participating to the computation under the presented trust 
model? To solve this problem, the following properties need 
to be satisfied: 
Mutual trust. Assuming that the declared code is executed 
within TEEs, mutual trust guarantees that: (1) only the final 
result r of the computation can be disclosed, i.e., none of the 
raw data of any participant is leaked and r is honestly 
computed as declared, (2) only the data strictly specified for 
the computation is requested from the participant PDMSs, (3) 
the computation code is generic and makes it possible to verify 
that any collected data is genuine2. 
Local assurance of validity. The querier and each involved 
participant must be able to monitor locally (i.e., on its own, 
without relying on a central trusted party) that the computation 
is being performed in compliance with the code declaration, 
by all other participants. If any honest participant detects a 
validity violation, an error is produced and the computation 
stops without producing any other (partial) result. 
Resilience to side-channel attacks. Assuming a small 
fraction of malicious (colluding) participants involved in the 
computation with corrupted TEEs, our framework must (1) 
guarantee that the leakage remains circumscribed to the data 
manipulated by the sole corrupted TEEs, (2) prevent the 
                                                          
2 Assuming data genuineness can be actually verified by the running code 
in any way (e.g., thanks to a digital signature). 
attackers from targeting a specific intermediate result (e.g., 
sensitive data or data of targeted participants) and (3) 
maximize the Cost/Benefit ratio of an attack. Note that this is 
the best we can do assuming that the code manipulates clear 
data and that side channel attacks can be performed. In 
addition, the means to achieve resilience should maintain the 
communication flow independent of the data being processed 
(i.e., attack resiliency should not affect the data independence 
assumption made in our trust model). 
To have a practical interest, the solution must finally: (1) 
be generic enough to support any distributed computations 
(e.g., from simple aggregate queries to advanced machine 
learning computations) and (2) scale to a large population 
(e.g., tens of thousands) of individuals.  
 
Figure 1 Manifest-based distributed computation. 
III. MUTUAL TRUST 
To provide the mutual trust property, we propose adopting 
a manifest-based approach. As described in Fig. 1, this 
approach is conducted in three steps: 
Step1: logical manifest declaration. We call Querier an 
entity (e.g., a research lab, a statistic agency or a company, 
acting as a data controller in the GDPR sense) wishing to 
execute a treatment over personal data. The Querier specifies 
a Logical Manifest describing the computation to be 
performed, namely: its purpose, the source code of the 
operator to be run at each participant, the distributed execution 
plan materializing the data flow between operators and a set 
Actor (with identity)
Logical Manifest
Physical Manifest
TEE Monitor
TEE Operation
Untrusted proxy
PDMS (personal data)
Attestation
Confidentiality
Corrupted TEE
….
Participant Participant
(corrupted)
Participant
Querier
Public store
Regul.
Citizen identityLegend:
result
1
1 Querier specifies and publish manifest; Regulator certifies it
Participants consent to manifest; Participants & querier build phys. manifest
Participants execute physi. manifest; Querier retrieves results (encrypted)
2
3
2 3
of privacy rules to be fulfilled, including data collection rules 
and expected number of participants. The Querier submits this 
logical manifest to a Regulatory body which certifies its 
compliance with the expected privacy practices. The certified 
logical manifest is then published in a public manifest store 
where it can be downloaded by individuals wishing to 
participate. We provide below an example (deliberately naïve 
for the sake of simplicity) of a logical manifest for a group-by 
query implemented using a MapReduce-like framework. 
Example 1: ‘Group-by’ manifest. 
Purpose:  
 Compute the mean quantity of anxiolytic 
 prescribed to employees group by employer 
Operators:  
 mapper source code  
 reducer source code  
Distributed execution plan and dataflow: 
  Number of mappers: 10.000  
  Number of reducers: 100  
 Any mapper linked to all reducers  
Collection rules:  
 SELECT employer_name FROM Job; 
 SELECT sum(qty)FROM Presc   
 WHERE drugtype = ‘anxiolytic’;  
Number of participants (data collectors): 10.000 
Querier Public key: Rex2%ÃźHj6k7âĂę 
Step2: physical manifest construction. Once certified, the 
manifest can be viewed as a logical distributed query plan 
(participants are not yet identified). When a sufficient number 
of potential participants consent to contribute with their data, 
a Physical Manifest is collectively established by the TEEs of 
all participants (according to our trust model, each participant 
is equipped with a TEE). A physical manifest assigns an 
operator to each participant. As detailed in Section V, this step 
is critical for resilience to side-channel attacks, by prohibiting 
corrupted participants from selecting specific operators in the 
query plan for malicious purpose. 
Step3: physical manifest evaluation. Each participant 
downloads the physical manifest (or the subpart allocated to 
him). The participant’s TEE initializes an enclave to execute 
his assigned operator and establishes communication channels 
with the TEEs of other participants supposed to exchange data 
with him (according to the manifest distributed execution 
plan). The participants then contributes his personal data to 
the operator and allows the computation to proceed. Once all 
participants have executed their task, the end-result is 
delivered to the querier.  
Let us introduce the following definitions in order to 
analyze how mutual trust is achieved. 
Definition 1: Distributed Execution Plan (DEP). A 
distributed execution plan DEP is defined as a directed graph 
(V, E) where V vertices are couples (opi, aj)OPA with OP 
the set of operators to be computed and A the set of computing 
agents, and E edges are couples (<opi, aj>,<opk, al>) 
materializing the dataflow among operators, namely the 
transmission by aj to al of opi output. For any vi  V, we denote 
by Ant(vi) (resp. Succ(vi)) the antecedents (resp. successors) of 
vi in the DEP, that is the vertices linked to vi by a direct 
incoming (resp. outgoing) edge. 
This representation of distributed execution plans is 
generic enough to capture most distributed data-oriented 
computations. Based on this definition, we can introduce the 
notion of logical manifest. 
Definition 2: Logical Manifest (LM). A logical manifest 
LM is defined as a tuple <PU, DEP, CR, N>, with PU the 
textual purpose declaration, DEP a distributed execution plan, 
CR the collection rule applied at each participant and N the 
expected number of participants.  
The CR declaration translates the limited collection 
principle enacted in all legislations protecting data privacy 
(i.e., no data other than the ones strictly necessary to reach the 
declared purpose PU will be collected). We assume that this 
declaration is done using a basic assertional language (e.g., a 
subset of an SQL-like language) easily interpretable by the 
Regulatory body on one side and easily translatable into the 
specific query language of any PDMSs on the participant’s 
side. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the data 
queried at each participant follow the same schema (if it is not 
the case, it is basically a matter of translating the collection 
rules in different schemas). N plays a dual role: it represents 
both a significance threshold for the Querier wrt. the declared 
purpose and a privacy threshold for the Regulatory body wrt. 
the risk of reidentification of any individual in the final result. 
The notion of physical manifest can be defined as follows.  
Definition 3: Physical Manifest (PM). A physical manifest 
PM is defined as a tuple <LM, P, F, QCR>  such that: (1) 
function F: LM.DEP.A P assigns agents to the participants 
P contributing to the computation of LM; (2) F is bijective, so 
that a given participant cannot play the role of different agents 
and each agent is represented by a participant; (3) any query 
qiQCR is the translation for participant pj of the collection rule 
LM.CR into the query language of his PDMS.  
Definition 4: PM valid execution. An execution of a 
physical manifest PM is said valid if the execution has not 
deviated in any manner from what is specified in LM, i.e., (i) 
the operators in LM.DEP.OP are each executed by the TEE of 
the participant designated by F while respecting the dataflow 
imposed by LM.DEP.E, (ii) the TEE of any participant pi 
queries its host with qi, (iii) N different participants contribute 
to the computation and (iv) all data exchanged between the 
participants’ TEEs are encrypted with session keys. 
Lemma 1. Under the hypothesis H1 that the execution of a 
PM is valid and H2 that no TEE have been corrupted, the 
mutual trust property is satisfied.  
We postpone to Section IV how to achieve hypothesis H1 
and to Section V the counter-measures suggested in the case 
hypothesis H2 does not hold.  
Proof of Lemma 1. The three conditions in mutual trust 
definition given in Section II hold by construction. First, 
condition (1) is satisfied because H1 guarantees that each 
operator in DEP.OP is executed within a TEE, and H2 and the 
TEE’s confidentiality property ensure that no data can leak 
other than the input and output of each DEP.OP. Encrypting 
the data exchanges between each vertex vi and Ant(vi) and 
Succ(vi) in DEP with a session key ensures the confidentiality 
of the global execution of PM.DEP. The final result is itself 
sent encrypted to the Querier so that no raw data other than 
the final result can leak all along the execution. Second, 
condition (2) stems from the fact that each participant pi is 
presented with qi which is a translation of LM.CR. The honest 
execution of qi over pi’s PDMS remains however under the 
participant’s responsibility who selected it to protect his 
personal data. Regarding condition (3), H1 and H2 again 
guarantee the integrity of the global execution of PM.DEP. 
Note that this guarantee holds even in the presence of 
corrupted TEEs since side-channel attacks on TEEs may 
compromise the confidentiality of the processing but not the 
isolation property. It immediately follows that any check 
integrated in the operator code can be faithfully performed on 
cleartext data, thus ensuring genericity.  
Compared to state of the art solutions, our manifest-based 
approach holds the capacity to reconcile security with 
genericity and scalability. First, the TEE confidentiality 
property can be leveraged to execute the computation code at 
each participant over cleartext genuine data. Second, the shape 
of the DEP and then the resulting number of messages 
exchanged among participants, directly results from the 
distributed computation to be performed. Hence, conversely 
to MPC, homomorphic encryption, Gossip or Differential 
privacy approaches, no computational constraints 
compromising genericity nor performance constraints 
compromising scalability need to be introduced in the 
processing for security reasons. 
IV. LOCAL ASSURANCE OF VALIDITY  
Once mutual trust is ensured, one needs to ensure that each 
participant gets the assurance that the computation was 
performed as expected. Ideally, this means that the 
computation should behave as if all participants could 
continuously monitor all the others, i.e., check all operator 
computations, ensuring correction of sent/received data at 
each step, and abort the whole process if any misbehavior 
happens. This is formalized in the following definition. At this 
stage, we assume that the execution plan has been produced 
by an arbitrary function build_phys_manifest, assigning a 
position i in the execution plan to each participant (the strategy 
for performing this assignment is discussed in Section V). We 
also assume that the local code executed by a participant either 
terminates successfully or explicitly returns an error. 
Definition 5: locally checkable execution. The execution 
of a distributed execution plan DEP is said locally checkable 
if for any participant pjPM.P, either (i) pj’s view of the 
partial execution up to pj’s role is valid or (ii) pj returns an 
error and no data is ever transmitted to other participants. 
An immediate consequence of Definition 5 is that, for any 
locally checkable execution, either a global result is produced 
if the execution is valid or no intermediate values is ever 
leaked. It follows that a protocol guaranteeing locally 
checkable executions for a DEP exactly provides local 
assurance of validity as any deviation from the normal 
execution would result in an invalid execution and would 
therefore result in an error at the participant’s level. 
As participants execute code in TEEs, a naïve way to 
satisfy Definition 5 is to instrument the code of each operator 
in order to make sure that before sending out any (partial) 
result the code gets approval from all other participants. While 
this solution trivially satisfies our goal of local assurance of 
validity, the communication overhead with a large number of 
participants is overwhelming. 
In order to overcome the aforementioned problem, we 
leverage the fact that using the TEE mechanisms and 
attestation, one can rely on checks made within other 
participant’s TEEs. In our architecture, the foundation of local 
checkability is the decomposition of the code running at each 
participant in a generic TEE monitor and a specific TEE 
computation code. The objective of this distinction is to avoid 
the need for any participant to recompile the code running on 
the other participants and compute its hash to evaluate the 
validity of the requested remote attestations. The execution at 
each participant then works as follows: (1) untrusted code 
executed on the local host, called untrusted proxy in Fig. 2, 
creates a TEE enclave and launches the TEE monitor code 
inside this enclave, (2) the TEE monitor, the role of which is 
to interpret the manifest and drive the local execution, creates 
a second enclave to launch the TEE computation code 
corresponding to the operator assigned to the participant in the 
execution plan. Note that all of the scheduling is performed by 
the untrusted proxy, in particular waking up TEE monitors as 
they are needed for the computation.  
The TEE monitor code is identical for each participant, so 
that its hash is known by everyone. This code is minimal, can 
be easily formally proved and is assumed trusted by all 
participants. This lets us consider the manifest LM as data, 
including the code of the local operator to be computed, let 
each local TEE monitor check the integrity of this data and 
then attest the other participants (antecedents and successors 
in the execution plan) to the genuineness of the TEE 
computation code. Antecedents and successors can easily 
check in turn the validity of the received remote attestation by 
checking only the genuineness of the remote TEE monitor. 
This double attestation by the antecedents and by the 
successors is mandatory to guarantee, for each participant, the 
validity of the inputs it receives and the authenticity of the 
recipients for its own outputs. This transitive attestation 
principle is depicted in Fig. 2. 
Following this strategy, local checkability is guaranteed. 
Intuitively, if a specific participant does not execute the 
genuine TEE monitor, it will be unable to provide a valid 
attestation to its partners (antecedents/successors) which will 
stop the execution and return an error. Then, if all participants 
run the correct TEE monitor and execute the same manifest, 
the execution is necessarily correct, since the TEE monitor 
only executes its dedicated code, and attestation prevents 
attacks from the OS on the result of the TEE computation 
code. If, however, one participant does not execute the correct 
manifest, its antecedents/successors will fail during the 
manifest verification. Finally, for any execution plan 
represented by a connected graph, the validity of the global 
execution is obtained by propagating errors through the 
execution graph, if an error occurs at any point during the 
computation. In order to prevent an attacker from running a 
large number of instances of a computation code in enclaves, 
each enclave must be tied to an identity, certified by a citizen 
identity provider.  
The pseudo code of the TEE monitor is provided in 
Algorithm 1. For the sake of conciseness, we restrict this 
algorithm to the management of tree-based execution plans, 
however extending it to any graph is just a matter of allowing 
multiple successors. Note that the scheduling of the execution 
and errors propagation can be handled by untrusted code. 
Indeed, if a participant encounters an error, it would typically 
propagate it upstream so as not to let successor’s enclaves 
hanging. However, it is by no means security critical as 
successor’s enclave would simply never execute if they fail to 
receive their antecedents’ inputs. 
Algorithm 1. TEE monitor 
Input: LM the logical manifest, id = (ski, pki, certi) the participants’ 
cryptographic identity and the corresponding certificate  
Output: boolean indicating success  
1. if verify(LM) = false then // verify manifest  
2.  return error 
3. PM  build_phys_manifest(LM, id)  // build physical manifest 
4. i  get_my_position(PM, ski)  
5. PMi  extract(PM, i)  
6. Qi, Pi, Ci, opi  Parse(PMi)   
7. for each antecedent  Ci do // get antecedents’ outputs 
8.  if not(channel(antecedent, self.code)) then return error 
9.  if not(id_check(antecedent)) then return error 
10.  if antecedent.PM  PM then return error 
11.  input_tuples + accept_input(antecedent)  
12. input_tuples + out_call(Qi)  // query PDMS 
13. EOPi  create_enclave(opi)  // create opi enclave  
14. if not(channel(EOPi, opi) then return error 
15. send_tuples(input_tuples, EOPi)  // produce output 
/* NB: integrity of input_tuple is checked in OPi enclave code */ 
16. res_opi  accept_input(EOPi)  // execute opi 
17. successor  get_ successor(PM,res_opi) 
18. if successor = querier then  
19.  a  attest(res_opi, PM) 
20.  send(a, res_opi) 
21.  return success 
22. if not(channel(successor), self.code) then return error  
23. if not(id_check(successor)) then return error 
24. if successor.PM  PM then return error  
25. send_tuples(res_opi, successor)  
26. return success 
While hidden in the pseudo code, we assume that all 
communications between participants and the different 
enclaves are performed on secure channels. This is crucial to 
ensure that the endpoints of channels lie in real TEE enclaves 
and to prevent an adversary capable of observing the 
communications from getting access to user data. A primitive 
reaching this goal is called attested key exchange [5]. It allows 
to exchange a key with an enclave executing a specific 
program, and hence ensures (using the attestation mechanism) 
that the endpoint of the channel lies within an enclave and that 
the enclave is executing the expected program, even if the 
administrator of the machine running the enclave is corrupted. 
We abstract this creation of a secure channel as channel( 
remote, expected_code) where remote is the remote enclave 
and expected_code is the code expected to be running in the 
remote enclave. The cost is essentially 1 remote attestation 
and 2 communications. Once established, all communications 
are assumed to be done on this channel. For simplicity’s sake 
we abstract away who is the initiator of the secure channel and 
view this process as symmetric. 
Algorithm description. In lines 1 to 6, the integrity of the 
logical manifest is verified by checking its signature, the 
physical manifest is built in collaboration with the other 
participating TEE monitors (cf. Section V, which also covers 
the explanation of line 4, not required in this section) and the 
part of the manifest related to this participant is extracted (i.e., 
the set of its antecedents/successors, the data collection query 
used to retrieve data from the local PDMS and the code of the 
operator to be evaluated locally).  
Then, in lines 7 to 12, the attestation of each antecedent is 
verified, by comparing the hash value of the code it is running 
to the hash value of the TEE monitor code (common to each 
participant). Once the antecedent TEE monitor is known to be 
correct, we check that it runs the correct manifest. We also 
check its identity by requiring its enclave to send it. This 
provides enough assurance because once we know the code of 
its enclave we know that it will honestly send its identity. 
Finally, the input tuples of the local operator are retrieved 
from its antecedents and/or the local PDMS of this participant.  
In lines 13 to 16, the TEE monitor creates an additional 
enclave for the operator to be run (its code is part of the 
manifest) and requests an attestation from this enclave (the 
hash of the operator is compared to the hash of the code 
computed by the TEE monitor) to make sure that the host did 
not compromise or impersonate the operator code. Then the 
monitor establishes a secure channel with the operator 
enclave, using an attested key exchange as in [5] and TEE 
monitor calls the operator using the appropriate inputs.  
Finally, in lines 17 to 26, the TEE monitor, either sends 
the result to the querier if its result is the final result, together 
with an attestation guaranteeing the result was indeed 
produced by the correct computation of the specified data; or 
sends its result to the next participants as planned by the DEP.  
Proposition 1. Algorithm 1 satisfies the locally checkable 
execution property for the physical manifest PM derived from 
the logical manifest LM by the build_phys_manifest function. 
The sketch of proof of Proposition 1 is given in [23]. 
V. RESILIENCE TO SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS  
According to our trust model, a small fraction of TEEs can 
be instrumented by malicious (colluding) participants owning 
them to conduct side-channel attacks compromising the TEE 
confidentiality property. This issue is paramount in our 
Manifest-based approach which draws its genericity and 
scalability from the fact that computing nodes manipulate 
cleartext genuine data, putting them at risk.  
The resilience to side-channel attacks property introduced 
in Section II, states first that the leakage generated by an attack 
must be circumscribed to the data manipulated solely by the 
corrupted TEEs. This is intrinsically achieved in our proposal 
by never sharing any cryptographic information among 
different nodes. A second requirement is to prevent any 
attacker from targeting specific personal data. Randomness 
and Sampling are introduced next to achieve this goal. Finally, 
DEP reshaping is proposed to tackle the third requirement, 
i.e., maximizing the average Cost/Benefit ratio of an attack. 
A. Randomness and Sampling 
In a physical manifest, we distinguish participants 
assigned to a collection task (which contribute to the query 
with their own personal raw data) from participants assigned 
to a computation task (which process personal data produced 
by other participants). Attacking any TEE running a collection 
task has no interest since the attacker only gains access to his 
own personal data. Hence, the primary objective of an attacker 
is to tamper with the building phase of a physical manifest 
such that his TEE is assigned a computation task to leak the 
data it manipulates. The randomness counter-measure assigns 
a random position in the DEP to each participant. More 
precisely, it ensures that for a given physical manifest PM, any 
participant pj ∈ PM.P is able to locally verify that its position 
and the position of any other participant in PM.P have been 
obtained randomly. A protocol achieving this goal, adapted 
from [22], can be found in [23]. The idea is to ensure that the 
randomness is generated by an enclave once the querier has 
committed to the list of participants. As we consider that 
enclave integrity may not be compromised, this ensures that 
this number is chosen uniformly at random even in the 
presence of an active adversary. 
 
Figure 2. Attestation flow for position i. 
The second counter-measure to prevent an attacker from 
selecting its position in the DEP is to add a sampling phase in 
Step2 (physical manifest construction, Section III) by 
selecting a given rate  of individuals accepting to contribute 
to the computation. The lower this rate , the more TEEs need 
be corrupted to keep the same probability of selecting a given 
position in the built DEP for an attacker. For conciseness, we 
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refer to a technical report [23] for details on randomness and 
sampling algorithms and security proofs. 
B. DEP Reshaping  
In our context, the Cost factor of the Cost/Benefit ratio is 
expressed in terms of the number of TEEs to corrupt and the 
Benefit is measured by the amount of personal data leaked by 
the attack. While randomness and sampling contribute to 
exacerbate the Cost factor, our third countermeasure aims at 
reducing the amount of raw data exposed at a single TEE. To 
introduce the idea, let us consider a DEP with n participants, 
among which m computation nodes computing a function f 
and n-m collection nodes contributing with their own data. 
With the randomness countermeasure, the probability to 
corrupt exactly t computation nodes among m with c corrupted 
participants (side-channel attacks), follows an hypergeometric 
distribution 𝑝𝑛,𝑚,𝑐(𝑥 = 𝑡) = (
𝑚
𝑥
)(𝑛−𝑚
𝑐−𝑥
) (𝑛
𝑐
)⁄ . The probability 
of corrupting t or more computation tasks over m is then: 
𝑝𝑛,𝑚,𝑐(𝑡 𝑥 𝑚) = ∑ (
𝑚
𝑥
)(𝑛−𝑚
𝑐−𝑥
)
𝑚
𝑥=𝑡
(𝑛
𝑐
)⁄ . 
With n=10000, m=10 and c=100 (which is a high number 
of corrupted participants), the probability of corrupting at least 
one computation node is p10000,10,100 (1  x 10)=0.095, while 
with m=100, this probability drops to p10000,100,100 (10  x 
100)=5.10-8. For simplicity, we assume that each participant 
contributes with exactly one tuple mapped to a single 
computation node, hence each computation node processes 
(and may endanger) on average N/m tuples (1000 tuples here).  
  
Figure 3. Probability and expected values in tuples of successful attacks. 
Fig. 3 (left) plots the privacy benefit of increasing the 
number of computation nodes by reshaping the DEP such that 
each initial computation node mi is split in rf new computation 
nodes sharing mi’s initial computing load, with rf denoting the 
reshaping factor. More precisely, this curve plots the 
probability to leak the same amount of data as with the 
original settings in function of the number c of corrupted 
nodes with different reshaping factor rf (e.g., rf=1 is the initial 
settings with m=10 computation nodes, rf=2 means m=20, 
etc.). Unsurprisingly, increasing rf dramatically decreases the 
probability of an attack leaking the same amount of tuples 
since rf different computation nodes (among rfm) must now 
be corrupted with the same number c of corrupted participants.  
Fig. 3 (right) shows the expected value in number of 
leaked tuples (i.e., sum of the probability of a successful attack 
on some computation nodes times the number of tuples 
leaked) in the case of successful side-channel attacks with 
c=100 corrupted nodes. The expected gain is always small, 
although the number c of corrupted TEE is relatively high, and 
reduces linearly with rf, which is deterrent for attackers. 
Indeed, the probability to successfully break two computation 
nodes is close to zero, hence the expected gain is nearly given 
by the probability of breaking a single computation node times 
the number of leaked tuples processed in that node, which 
linearly decreases with rf. These results are true if m and c are 
small compared to n, which is typically the case in our context. 
The conclusion is that, while maximizing the distribution 
of a computation has recognized virtues in terms of 
performance and scalability (explaining the success of 
MapReduce or Spark models), this strategy leads as well to a 
better resilience against side-channel attacks. Maximizing the 
distribution can be done by exploiting some properties of the 
functions to be evaluated by DEP computation nodes: 
Definition 6: Distributive function. Let f be a function to 
be computed over a dataset D, f is said distributive if there 
exists a function g such that f(D) = g(f(D1), f(D2), …, f(DN)) 
where Di forms a partition of D (e.g., D = i ( (i, Di)) with  
a selection function).   
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Definition 7: Algebraic function. A function f is said 
algebraic if f can be computed by a combination of distributive 
functions (e.g., mean(D) = sum(D)/count(D)).  
For any DEP node computing a distributive or algebraic 
function, the number of D input tuples exposed to that node 
can be linearly reduced by augmenting the number of Di 
partitions in the same proportion. This general principle, 
called DEP reshaping, splits distributive/algebraic tasks 
allocated to a single participant into several tasks allocated to 
different nodes, each working on a partition of the initial input.  
Definition 8: rf-reshaping. Given an attribution function 
𝑎𝑡: 𝑉 → {1, … , 𝑟𝑓} associating vertices to integers uniformly, 
a distributed execution plan DEP’(V’,E’) is obtained by rf-
reshaping from DEP(V,E) such that: V’V and 
vi=(ai,opi)V/ distrib_algebra(opi)=true  vi,j’=(ai,j,opi) 
V’ with j:1..rf, and vi,j’Ant(vi) in E’ and vAnt(vi) in E, 
vAnt(vi,j’) with 𝑗 = 𝑎𝑡(𝑣) in E’. 
This definition is illustrated on Fig. 4, showing a DEP with 
6 additional computation nodes obtained by 3-reshaping from 
an initial DEP with only 2 computation nodes. Note that the 
communication overhead is very small, as only one additional 
message from each added reshaped node to the original node 
is produced compared to the original execution. In the 
remainder of the paper, we call a cluster all vertices attributed 
to the same reshaped node (i.e. 𝑎𝑡−1(𝑗)). 
All other things being equal, rf-reshaping drastically 
reduce the data exposure at each computing node. Indeed, for 
any distributive/algebraic vertex vi in DEP, rf-reshaping 
divides the probability of gaining access to the entire input D 
of vi by a factor (
𝑛−𝑟𝑓
𝑐−𝑟𝑓
) ∏ (𝑛 − 𝑖) (𝑐 − 𝑖)⁄𝑖=1..𝑟𝑓 . 
The final issue is showing that rf-reshaping may hurt the 
independence between the processed data and the dataflow as 
specified in the initial DEP. Recall that a communication flow 
E is said data independent if the DEP is such that personal 
data cannot be inferred from observing the communication 
pattern among participants. E can be data independent by 
construction (e.g., broadcast-based algorithm) or be made 
data independent for privacy concern (e.g., sending fake data 
among participants to normalize the communications). It is 
thus mandatory to preserve this independence. 
Lemma 2. If the communication flow E of a distributed 
execution plan DEP(V,E) is data independent, the 
communication flow E’ of any DEP’(V’,E’) obtained by rf-
reshaping of DEP(V,E) is also data independent. 
The result is ensured by the fact that the communication 
flow in the DEP’ only depends on the communication pattern 
in DEP and the at( ) function in Definition 8, which in turn 
only depends on vertices identifiers and not on data. Hence, 
the communication flow E’ reveals nothing more about the 
transmitted data compared to E. 
The rf-reshaping principle can be applied in many 
practical examples of computations over distributed PDMSs, 
ranging from simple statistical queries to big data analysis, as 
illustrated in the validation section. The rf-reshaping process 
can be automatically performed by a precompiler taking as 
input a logical manifest LM and producing a transformed 
logical manifest LMminExp minimizing data exposure for the 
participants for each node computing distributive or algebraic 
functions. The degree of distribution impacts the performance 
and the protection of raw data in case of successful attacks 
(see Section VI), but selecting the optimal strategy and 
integrating it into a precompiler is left for future work. 
 
Figure 4. 3-reshaping of DEP with m=2 distributive computation nodes. 
VI. VALIDATION 
The effectiveness of the solution in terms of security and 
scalability is assessed on a platform composed of 8 SGX 
capable machines with Intel I5-7200U and 16GB RAM, 
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Root
……. … … …
result
Initial DEP DEP’ obtained by 3-reshaping of DEP
equipped with Intel SGX SDK 2.3.101 over Ubuntu 16.04. 
We consider two use-cases of distributed processing over 
personal data, to validate the genericity of our framework. 
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Figure 5. Security and performance evaluation. 
Group-by aggregation. We consider a MapReduce-like 
implementation of an aggregate with a group by query run 
over distributed PDMSs. The processing is as follows: (1) 
each mapper sends a couple (h(group_key), value) to a reducer 
where h is a hash function which projects the group key on a 
given reducer, (2) each reducer computes the aggregate 
function over the values received for the group keys it 
manages. If the aggregate function is distributive (e.g., count, 
min, max, sum, rank, etc.) or algebraic (e.g., avg, var, etc.), rf-
reshaping is applied to all reducer nodes. Sub-reducer nodes 
contribute to the computation of the function for a subset of a 
grouping value and the initial reducers combine their work.  
K-means clustering. It is similarly computed: (1) k initial 
means representing the centroid of k clusters are randomly 
generated by the querier and sent to all participants to initialize 
the processing, (2) each participant acting as a mapper 
computes its distance with these k means and sends back its 
data to the reducer node managing the closest cluster, (3) each 
reducer recomputes the new centroid of the cluster it manages 
based on the data received from the mappers and sends it back 
to all participants. Steps 2 and 3 are repeated a number of 
times. The function computed by step 3 is algebraic since the 
centroid of a cluster ci can be computed thanks to sums and 
counts computed over all sub-clusters of ci. Hence, the number 
of reducers in step 3 can also be arbitrarily augmented by rf-
reshaping, such that each of the k initial reducers is preceded 
in DEP by a set of sub-reducers computing a partial centroid. 
The SGX platform is used to perform real measurements 
at small scale (up to 100 participants) and to calibrate an 
analytical model required to conduct large scale experiments. 
We used synthetic datasets since the primary goal is not 
studying the peak performance for specific data distributions 
and save seconds or minutes (manual surveys over thousands 
of participants usually take weeks). We present in Fig. 5 a 
summary of our results and give the main outcome. We refer 
to [23] for extensive experiments and details.  
Several conclusions can be drawn. First, even if the overall 
time can be considered rather high (tens of minutes for large 
numbers of participants), it is not a critical issue in our context 
from a querier perspective. Second, rf-reshaping drastically 
reduces the elapsed time by augmenting the parallelism while 
decreasing the number of attestations between mappers and 
reducers. Third rf-reshaping is deterrent for attackers by 
acting on the Benefit/Cost ratio, even for low values of rf. 
VII. RELATED WORKS 
Several works focus on protecting outsourced databases 
with encryption, but most of the existing encryption schemes 
applied to databases have been shown vulnerable to inference 
attacks [7]. Going further induces fully homomorphic 
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encryption [8] with intractable performance issues. Some 
works [4] deploy secure hardware at database server side. 
These solutions are centralized by nature and do not match our 
assumption that no hardware module is perfectly secure. 
In terms of decentralized computing, Secure Multi-Party 
Computations (MPC) have been adapted to databases (e.g. 
SMCQL [6]), but only support a few tens of participants. 
Using secure hardware, TrustedPals [9,12] makes MPC more 
scalable, but their goal and security assumptions differ from 
ours. TrustedPals ensures that results are distributed to all 
honest parties, and that all received results are consistent. 
Hence, TrustedPals is highly fault tolerant as opposed to our 
solution. Our solution is simpler, as it only aims at delivering 
the result to a querier, and thus does away with the consensus 
protocols. However, at the end of the computation, all 
involved parties in TrustedPals hold the entirety of the data 
within their security module, which would be unacceptable in 
our case as some TEEs might be compromised. 
Several works suggest distributed computation schemes 
providing anonymous data exchanges and confidential 
processing using gossip-style protocols [2]. They typically 
scale well but are not generic in terms of computations. 
Similarly, decentralized processing solutions based on secure 
hardware have also been proposed for aggregate queries [17] 
but do not match our genericity objective. 
To the best of our knowledge, all works regarding 
executing data oriented task using SGX (e.g. Ryoan [14]) have 
a unique controller, as opposed to our setting where no unique 
individual is supposed to be in control of the computation. 
Additionally, most of the time this controller also provides the 
data to be computed on. This greatly simplifies the problem as 
a same controller verifies all enclaves and organizes the 
computation. Other works [14], following VC3 [16], provide 
SGX-based Map-Reduce frameworks for executing 
computations in the cloud to ensure data confidentiality and 
hide communication patterns between mappers and reducers, 
but again, they consider a unique controller. Communication 
between enclaves in these works is quite similar to ours, but 
the assumption of a unique controller completely removes the 
need for establishing trust at a local level, which is exactly 
what our notion of local checkability aims at solving. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Smart disclosure initiatives and new regulations push for 
the adoption of Personal Data Management Systems managed 
under individual's control while keeping the capability to 
cross personal data of multiple individuals (e.g., economic, 
epidemiological or sociological studies). However, without 
appropriate security measures, the risk is high to see 
individuals refuse their contribution. Only fragmented 
solutions have emerged so far. The generalization of Trusted 
Execution Environment at the edge of the network changes 
the game. This paper capitalizes on this trend and proposes a 
generic secure decentralized computing framework where 
each participant gains the assurance that his data is used for 
the purpose he consents to and that only the final result is 
disclosed. Conversely, the querier is assured that the result has 
been honestly computed. We have shown the practicality of 
the solution in terms of privacy and performance. We hope 
that this work will lay the groundwork for thinking differently 
about decentralized computing on personal data. 
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